What Is War?

View transcript: What Is War?

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How does Clausewitz define war? / What is the President of the United States referring to when he talks about the CHANGED FACE OF WAR in the 21st century? / What historical knowledge do we have about WARS THAT DID NOT COME TO AN END? / Oskar Negt, writer and social researcher, discusses the recent linguistic confusion regarding the concept of war - -
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WHAT IS WAR? / Oskar Negt about continuities and changes of war in the 21st century
Alexander Kluge
What is war?
Oskar Negt
Of course, it’s a very complex concept, but for example, according to Clausewitz’ definition, war is a “continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.” He tries to understand war as a structure of events, where one community tries to exert their power over another community by means of going to war. He defines that in the following way: “War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” Not to destroy them but to … and when Clausewitz is asked: How do you define war? Is it an art or a science? He says, no, neither art nor science, it is more comparable to trade. Trade. That means, two sovereign subjects exchange something, and as it is custom among business partners, you cannot kill your business partner. That would be robbery. War is a kind of trade where you gain advantages by paralyzing and limiting the other’s will, by subjecting him to your own will.
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Professor Dr. Oskar Negt, social researcher
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Carl von Clausewitz
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The subjective side of war
Kluge
Weapons and weather conditions alone don’t decide battles. It also requires a thumos, the inner motivation driving the soldiers. And that is very much tied to a specific era. His argument has developed from his observation of the Napoleonic Wars, the French Revolution, and the Prussian military reform.
Negt
And of course the nationalistic wars. They are not cabinet wars anymore, but they are … even the war of 1870/71, the German-French war is not a true cabinet war anymore in that sense, although it still has a lot of its characteristics. After the Emperor is locked up, has been captured, the war is over. That’s not the case anymore in modern global wars. That means, the concept of war has changed. And when you say today, as our Chancellor would say: This is a war against human civilization, or Bush says something similar, then it’s impossible to reconcile that with definitions of war refering to the sovereign formations of the fighting parties, in other words, marching armies. Because in this case, for Clausewitz, that means that you know your opponent, you can call them by name. Even the NATO never thought …
Kluge
For Clausewitz there were no asymmetrical wars.
Negt
No. Even according to the definition of the NATO it means that you don’t have to start looking for your opponent, find them through secret service agencies. It means that a nation or an alliance attacks with armies … with soldiers, with weaponry, with a specific intention and a declaration of war … but the war on terror looks completely different.
Kluge
There are chaotic forms of immediate violence before the Thirty Years’ War, before the religious wars in France, from robber barons to invasions to land seizures … all kinds of violence. And as a result of the suffering during the Thirty Years’ War, a war that doesn’t want to end, Hugo Grotius has a definition in his work on the law of nations, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, and that has the opposite definition of war. For Clausewitz, the definition of war is derived from the duel, like a duel between nations, and the duel happens according to rules, that means advantages which serve to make peace, and which eventually can be turned, during the negotiations for a peace treaty, into trade benefits, if you will. But that only works as long as my war remains somewhat fair, if it remains comprehensible to outsiders, if it allows the opponent to subject their will to the victor.
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CAPITULATION / The greatest achievement of a classical war / Pufendorf, Grotius, Kant
Negt
That means, the whole question of rational process grounded in international law increases in urgency. And of course that plays a big role in Pufendorf’s, Grotius’, but also Kant’s theories of natural law. The hope to make these processes more rational, even if you can’t prevent war – and perhaps shouldn’t even prevent it. That means that certain things are kept distinct: for example a clear definition of those who are considered soldiers as opposed to civilians. And that comes to an end in the 20th century. The number of civilian deaths keeps growing.
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Professor Dr. Oskar Negt, social researcher
Kluge
Also during bomb raids, fires burning cities to the ground, in guerilla wars …
Negt
And the same is true for the African wars after World War II. Three quarters of all wars after World War II are internal wars, that means civil wars. And up to 80 or 90 percent of the civilian population are affected by these wars.
Kluge
So that we can only think of a concept of war in the sense of the hope that there could be something like a domesticated conflict. That is the hope of those concerned with international law.
Negt
I would say that after Clausewitz’ definition of war disappears, the concept of war needs to be differentiated. It cannot be limited to the types of conflict that used to characterize war, but we also need to consider forms of violence, aggression …
Kluge
… structural violence, economic violence …
Negt
Many other things …
Kluge
Massacres, outbreaks, collisions, accidents …
Negt
And of course other elements that are related to war, such as punitive expeditions, police raids. Finding a criminal like Bin Laden, that’s basically a manhunt. That’s how you hunt criminals. And there’s little difference between this and the story of the RAF, the Baader-Meinhof group, since they both declare war to increase their own legitimacy. The RAF declares war on the system, but it’s a symbolically unjustified use of the concept of war.
Kluge
It is an overestimation. A single individual cannot simply say: I declare war. Not even Michael Kohlhaas. But the President of the United States also cannot simply say: I declare these events to be war. That wouldn’t …
Negt
The legitimation for starting a counterattack is also pretty questionable. They are starting a defensive war … that’s Bush’s explanation: Now we are leading a defensive war But it’s a very problematic use of the concept of war.
Kluge
It has little to do with the idea of war. It has to do with the need to justify violence.
Negt
On both sides. And ultimately, by calling it a war, Bush gives the other side the opportunity to frame their aggression as a Holy War.
Kluge
Which they also might have done without his statement. Even if he hadn’t talked about a crusade, they would have used this aggressive tone. Both are abstract.
Kluge
If we want to talk a bit about the simultaneity of different forms of war; that means different forms of violence that are committed on this planet. There are atavistic clan wars, neighborhood wars, massacres, right next to technologically highly stylized forms of war that are fought by means of satellites. Then there are all kinds of pre-wars – missile defense systems and all these measures are a kind of pre-war, after all. The accumulation of weapons, in order to put the opponent, entire nations like China, at a disadvantage. That is possible without a declaration of war, but it is still an act of war. That means, highly modernized and ancient forms of war still coexist simultaneously on the planet.
Negt
Yes. I think we need to get rid of the substance-concept of war and translate it into a relation-concept. That’s how Ernst Cassirer once explained it: you need to eliminate the substance-concepts. And many things only become recognizable underneath this definition of war, which is very much tied to specific social formations, national formations. For example, if we take the Schroffenstein Family, the play by Kleist, it is a campaign of destruction, a revenge spree of family clans, where one kills another, which then legitimizes others to strike back and kill someone from the other tribe. Entire tribes are at war.
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War in Antiquity / micromanagement vs. macromanagement
Kluge
The determination that drives the runner of Marathon who delivers a message, or the determination to defeat the enormous ships of the Persians with tiny ships in a strait. All of those are forms of micromanagement, could you say that?
Negt
Well, it also has already something to do with the budding rationality of the pre-Socratics. The Ionic cities develop a kind of urban rationality, a philosophy. It’s not the religious myths anymore that dominate and determine social life, but there is an urban citizenry which is concerned with their freedom, so there is something at stake for them …
Kluge
They enjoy life and know how to express that. They have a public.
Negt
Yes.
Kluge
And these aspects, all of whom involve a micromanagement of determination, indicate that the battle is decided in the minds of these people; it is not won or lost on the battlefield.
Negt
That is certainly true. That has to do, on the one hand, with the strategic rationality, and on the other hand with the growing self-confidence of a Greek unified community. The individual poleis, the cities keep growing together. Not in their … they are still competing with each other, they still fight. But in their cultural self-consciousness as Greeks, a Greek-speaking people, they develop a distinction from the barbaroi, those who don’t speak Greek …
Kluge
And when they come and want to take over in order to subject these peoples to an administration, the administration of Asia Minor, then their imagination, the aggression, the micromanagement are enough to fend them off. That’s correct, isn’t it? But that doesn’t happen anymore during the Peloponnesian Wars. What are the Peloponnesian Wars?
Negt
Well, the Peloponnesian Wars are a conflict between two major powers, the two large competing cities: Athens, Pericles’ city, and Sparta …
Kluge
It goes on for years, it just doesn’t end. The plague becomes an additional complication. People die in masses from a bacterial disease, but as a consequence of the war.
Negt
But the plague is not caused by the war, it just coincides. That’s what kills Pericles. The Peloponnesian War begins in 430, 431. It’s terribly destructive because the individual cities don’t really have any specific targets anymore. As Thucydides describes it very impressively, the Peloponnesian War is known as a war that is not really directed at an external enemy anymore … in fact, some cities actually start alliances with parts of Persia … but it causes enormous destruction.
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Pericles (500 – 429 v. Chr.)
Kluge
Similar to the Thirty Years’ War. At several points all the resources are completely depleted but they just keep going. Like a smoldering fire.
Negt
They keep going. And ultimately they destroy the large polis structures. It is not a coincidence that Socrates is executed in 399. The war ends in 400/401. And Socrates is turned into a scapegoat for the suffering of the city.
Kluge
He seduces the young people. He thinks too much. We don’t need that kind of thing. That is … Marathon and Salamis are basically a stroke of luck for the defensive war. That means, freedom is preserved. An identity is preserved, the war is brought to an end rather quickly. You could say that these smoldering fire wars are the worst. There is such a smoldering fire war in the middle of World War I, and it doesn’t want to end.
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Wars that cannot achieve peace
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Battle of Cannae (216 BC)
Kluge
Then there’s a second type of war that doesn’t manage to achieve peace. For example, the Battle of Cannae is famous for showing Hannibal’s total victory over the Romans. Every general has wanted to imitate this model of a battle at some point. But the battle doesn’t actually decide anything. He wins all the battles and loses the war. That’s pretty characteristic.
Negt
He doesn’t hit the center. He wins, he negotiates. For example, Cicero reports that he sends captured Romans into the Senate to negotiate after they have sworn an oath to return. Out of those ten Romans, nine return. The tenth returns as well, but he feels that he’s now released from his oath, and because he has forgotten something, he returns to Rome and stays there. And he is called in front of the Senate and sentenced to returning to Hannibal’s camp. Cicero says: That shows the significance of an oath during that time. Even an oath sworn to an enemy is binding. It would be dishonorable to break this oath … That means, it’s also a form of cultural respect. And Hannibal was scared to attack Rome, to attack the center. That’s why this victory was merely a partial victory, it was only one battle.
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Professor Dr. Oskar Negt, social researcher
Kluge
A Pyrrhic victory, as they say. And if you think about it … they want a Thirty Years’ War against terror. It’s going to be difficult to hit the center. Because they would need to defeat or subject two different opponents. The suffering people, on the one hand, who then inspire, on the other, representatives from millionaire families or middle-class backgrounds, who exercise terror on behalf of the people in Bangladesh or in the ghettos.
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Indirect terrorist motives
Kluge
For example, a terrorist does not want Christians to wander the Arabic peninsula and engage in the oil business. He is in conflict with his own government, the country he comes from. And turns his resentment against a symbol of the market. Not the global market itself, but a symbol of the global market. That’s a high level of abstraction. And you cannot win battles on the level of abstractions, no matter what side you are on. That’s a fact, isn’t it?
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G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831)
Negt
Correct.
Kluge
What does Hegel have to say about abstraction?
Negt
Hegel once said that to make abstraction count in reality means to destroy reality. Abstractions are things that destroy reality, they are never productive, constructive. And what we currently talk about as real abstractions, for example the globalized stock and finance market …
Kluge
… on the one hand, and the market of terror on the other …
Negt
They have in common that they are not anchored in their specific contexts of production, but in fact dissolve and destroy them. One real abstraction assigns pre-existing production structures to the global market, but they are not able to compete with the global market. The other is that this kind of symbolic politics destroys something that doesn’t even touch on the reality of American capitalism.
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Immanuel Kant on “THE CONSTRUCTION OF REASON“
Kluge
Immanuel Kant once said that we need housing for our experiences but lean towards erecting towers that aren’t suited to house experiences and only lead to divisiveness as a result of the confusion of languages
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Confusion of languages
Negt
That’s true. Of course they also have means of communication in gestures and facial expressions and other sublinguistic elements …
Kluge
There are misunderstandings, but it’s still better than one single language. If I think about the trend towards globalization as the process of introducing one language, and if the opposition uses references to medieval gods for purposes of legitimation, then you get two options: One administration that’s focused on profit, and one that is oriented towards legitimation, and they fire at each other on a high level of abstraction. And that’s not really an image of war, because the other’s will cannot really be subjugated.
Negt
No. Because the will of the opponent remains unrecognizable.
Kluge
And it’s impossible to make peace. It’s impossible to capitulate.
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WHAT IS WAR? / Oskar Negt about continuities and changes of war in the 21st century